Abstract. We give a constructive proof of Kruskal's Tree Theoremprecisely, of a topological extension of it. The proof is in the style of a constructive proof of Higman's Lemma due to Murthy and Russell (1990) , and illuminates the role of regular expressions there. In the process, we discover an extension of Dershowitz' recursive path ordering to a form of cyclic terms which we call µ-terms. This all came from recent research on Noetherian spaces, and serves as a teaser for their theory.
Introduction
Kruskal's Theorem [33] states that the homeomorphic embedding ordering on finite trees is a a well quasi-ordering. This is a deep and fundamental theorem in the theory of well quasi-orderings. The aim of this paper is to give a constructive, that is, an intuitionistic proof of this fact 1 . I will explain what all that means in Section 2. I should probably admit right away that I have not actively looked for such a proof. It came to me in 2010 as a serendipitous by-product of research I was doing on Noetherian spaces, seen as a generalization of well quasi-ordered spaces. The result is, hopefully, a nice piece of mathematics. It is also an opportunity for me to explain various related developments which I would dare to say have independent interest. I would like to issue a word of warning, though. The constructive proofs of the topological Higman and Kruskal theorems I am giving here were the first I found. The non-constructive proofs of [29, Section 9.7] came second. These are the ones I chose to publish, for good reason: once cast in formal language, the original constructive proofs are terribly heavy. I have therefore opted for a somewhat lighter presentation here, which stresses the beautiful core of the proof, at the cost at being somewhat sketchy in Sections 4 (Higman) and 5 (Kruskal) . And this core is: these theorems reduce to questions of termination problems, which one can solve by using multiset orderings (Higman) , resp. an extension of Dershowitz' multiset path ordering (Kruskal) . version of this paper, and Nachum Dershowitz, who gave me several additional pointers. I have had several interesting discussions with Sylvain Schmitz, Alain Finkel, and Jean-Pierre Jouannaud. All remaining errors are of course mine.
Well quasi-orderings, Noetherian spaces
A quasi-ordering on a set X is a reflexive and transitive binary relation ď on X. Given a subset A of X, we write Ò A for its upward closure ty P X | Dx P A¨x ď yu, and call A upward closed if and only if A " Ò A. A basis of an upward closed subset E is any set A such that E " Ò A; E has a finite basis if and only if one can take A finite. We define the downward closure Ó A, and downward closed subsets, similarly. We also write ě for the converse of ď, ă for the strict part of ď (x ă y iff x ď y and not y ď x), ą for that of ě.
There are many equivalent definitions of a well quasi-ordering (wqo for short), of which here are a few:
1. every infinite sequence px n q nPN in X is good, namely, there are two indices m ă n with x m ď x n ; 2. every infinite sequence px n q nPN in X is perfect, i.e., has an infinite ascending subsequence x n0 ď x n1 ď . . . ď x ni ď . . . (with n 0 ă n 1 ă . . . ă n i ă . . .); 3. ď is well-founded (there is no infinite descending sequence of elements x 0 ą x 1 ą . . . ą x n ą . . .) and has no infinite antichain (an infinite sequence of pairwise incomparable elements); 4. every upward closed subset U has a finite basis; 5. every ascending chain U 0 Ď U 1 Ď . . . Ď U n Ď . . . of upward closed subsets is stationary (i.e., all U n s are equal from some rank n onwards); 6. every descending chain F 0 Ě F 1 Ě . . . Ě F n Ě . . . of downward closed subsets is stationary; 7. the strict inclusion ordering Ă is well-founded on downward closed subsets, i.e., there is no infinite descending chain F 0 Ą F 1 Ą . . . Ą F n Ą . . . of downward closed subsets.
The latter shows that being a wqo is merely a termination property, only one not on words, or on terms, as would be familiar in computer science [13] , but rather on downward closed subsets. There are many useful wqos in nature: N with its natural ordering ď, any finite set, any finite product of wqos (in particular N k with its componentwise ordering: this is Dickson's Lemma [18] ), any finite coproduct of wqos, the set of finite words X˚over a well-quasi-ordered alphabet X (with the so-called word embedding quasi-ordering: this is Higman's Lemma [30] ), the set of finite trees, a.k.a., first-order terms, T pXq over a well-quasi-ordered signature X (with the so-called tree embedding quasi-ordering: this is Kruskal's Theorem [33] ), notably.
There are also more and more applications of wqo theory in computer science.
Termination. An early application is Nachum Dershowitz' discovery of the multiset path ordering on terms. This is a strict ordering ă mpo on terms that is well-founded, i.e., such that there is no infinite ą mpo -chain t 0 ą mpo t 1 ą mpo . . . ą mpo t n ą mpo . . .: to show that a rewrite system R terminates, it is enough to show that ą mpo r for every rule Ñ r in R. Dershowitz' initial proof ( [12] , see also [11] ) rested on the remark that ą mpo is a simplification ordering: if t embeds into s, then t ď mpo s. Given any infinite ą mpo -descending chain as above, by Kruskal's Theorem one can find i ă j such that t i embeds into t j . It follows that t i ď mpo t j , contradicting t i ą mpo t j . This uses characterization 1 of wqos. This simple argument definitely relies on Kruskal's deep result. The realization that Dershowitz' theorem required much less logical clout [26, 8] came to me as both a relief and a disappointment : I'll recapitulate the elementary argument in Section 3. I'll also give a slight extension of this elementary argument to a form of cyclic terms I have decided to call µ-terms. This will be instrumental in the rest of the paper, and may even be useful in the rewriting community.
Minimal patterns. A second application arises from characterization 4. Given an upward closed language L of elements in a wqo X, one can test whether x P L by just checking finitely many equalities x 1 ď x, . . . , x n ď x. Indeed, property 4 states that one can write L as Òtx 1 , . . . , x n u. For example, this is how van der Meyden shows that fixed monadic queries to indefinite databases can be evaluated in linear time in the size of the database [44] , where x, x 1 , . . . , x n are (encodings of models as) finite sequences of finite sets of logical atoms. The query L defines the minimal patterns x 1 , . . . , x n to be checked, in the embedding quasi-ordering on words. That the latter is a wqo is Higman's Lemma, and the fact that its standard proofs are non-constructive implies the curious fact that one cannot a priori compute x 1 , . . . , x n from L. That is, a linear time algorithm exists for each L. . . but what is it? Ogawa [40] solves the issue by extracting the computational content of Murthy and Russell's constructive proof of Higman's Lemma [37] . This computes the values x 1 , . . . , x n , hence derives a linear-time algorithm for the query L, from L given as input.
WSTS. Another application is in verification of well-structured transition systems (WSTS) [1, 25] . A WSTS is a (possible infinite-state) transition system pX, Ñq, with a wqo ď of the set of states X, satisfying a monotonicity property. For simplicity, we shall only consider strong monotonicity: if s Ñ s 1 and s ď t, then there is a state t 1 such that t Ñ t 1 and s 1 ď t 1 . Examples of WSTS abound. Petri nets are WSTS whose state space is N k , where k is the number of places. Affine nets [24] generalize these and many other variants, and are still WSTS on N k . Lossy channel systems [3] are networks of finite-state automata that communicate over FIFO queues. They are WSTS whose state space is ś m i"1 Q iˆś n j"1 Σj , where Q i is the finite state space of the ith automaton, and Σ j is the finite alphabet of the jth queue. Let us also cite data nets [34] , BVASS [46, 10] , and recent developments in the analysis of processes [36, 4, 47, 42] , which require tree representations of state.
The simple structure of a WSTS implies that coverability is decidable in every effective WSTS. This is the following question: given a state s P X and an upward closed subset U of X, is there a state t P U that is reachable from s, i.e., such that s Ñ˚t, where Ñ˚is the reflexive-transitive closure of Ñ? By effective WSTS, we mean that we can represent states on a computer (which implies that every upward closed subset U is representable as well, as a finite set E, by property 4), that ď is decidable, and that the set of one-step predecessors PrepU q " ts P X | Dt P U¨s Ñ tu of a state t is computable. This is the case of all WSTS mentioned above. Inclusion of upward closed subsets is decidable, since Ò E 1 Ď Ò E 2 if and only if for every x P E 1 , there is a y P E 2 with y ď x. That coverability is decidable is almost trivial: using a while loop, compute the successive sets U 0 " U , U n`1 " U n Y PrepU n q, and stop when U n`1 Ď U n ; this must eventually happen by property 5. Then there is a state in U that is reachable from s if and only if s P U n .
In 1969, Karp and Miller [32] devised another way (historically, the first one) of deciding coverability. They built a so-called coverability tree, and showed that it was finite and effectively constructible by resorting to Dickson's Lemma, plus a few additional tricks. One of the tricks they required was to extend the state space from N k to N k ω , where N ω is N plus a fresh top element ω, the limit of any ever growing sequence. Although it would seem natural that the construction would generalize to every WSTS, progress was slow. One of the blocking factors was to define a completion p X of a well quasi-ordered state space X, so that Karp and Miller's construction would adapt.
By analogy with N k , p X should be X with some limit points added, and this naturally calls for topology. Alain Finkel once asked me whether there would be a notion of completion from topology that could serve this purpose. We realized that the sobrification of X (see [29, Section 8.2] ) was the right candidate, and this led us to a satisfactory extension of Karp and Miller's procedure to all WSTS [20, 21, 23] .
Noetherian spaces. In the process, going to topology begged the question whether there is a topological characterization of wqos. I realized in [27] that this would be the notion of Noetherian space, invented in algebraic geometry in the first half of the 20th century. A Noetherian space is a space where every ascending chain of opens is stationary: comparing this with property 5, we have merely replaced "upward closed" by "open".
Every quasi-ordered set can be equipped with the so-called Alexandroff topology, whose opens are just the upward closed subsets. Property 5 immediately implies that every wqo is Noetherian, once equipped with its Alexandroff topology. The framework of Noetherian spaces also allows us to extend the WSTS methodology to more kinds of transition systems. I have explained this in [28] , applying this to two examples: a certain kind of multi-stack automata, and concurrent polynomial programs manipulating numerical values (in R) that communicate through discrete signals over lossy channels. The decidability results that I'm stating in these settings are far from trivial, but are low-hanging fruit once we have the theory of Noetherian spaces available.
By "theory of Noetherian spaces", I do not mean the one we inherit from algebraic geometry, rather some natural results that arise from cross-fertilization with wqo theory. (See [ set space of finite trees T pXq with symbol functions taken from X is Noetherian under the tree topology.
We define the word and tree topologies as follows. Intuitively, think of an open set U as a test-namely, x passes the test if and only if x P U . In the word topology, we wish the following to be a test: given tests U 1 , . . . , U n on letters (open subsets of X), the word w passes the test X˚U 1 X˚. . . X˚U n X˚if and only if w contains a (not necessarily contiguous) subword a 1 a 2 . . . a n with each a i in U i . In the tree topology, the basic tests are whether a given tree has an embedded subtree of a given shape, and where each function symbol is in a given open subset of X (possibly different at each node). In each case, these tests form bases for the required topologies, i.e., the opens are all unions of such tests. The proofs I give of these theorems in [29, Section 9.7] are elegant, yet terribly topological, and rest on many results that require classical logic, and the Axiom of Choice. Instead, we shall use the following remark.
Call a closed subset F irreducible if and only if, for every finite family of closed subsets
By [29, Theorem 9.7 .12], a space X is Noetherian if and only if: pÓq the strict inclusion relation Ă is well-founded on the set SpXq of irreducible closed subsets of X (SpXq happens to be the sobrification of X we alluded to above), pT q the whole space X can be written as the union of finitely many irreducible closed subsets of X, and pW q given any two irreducible closed subsets F 1 , F 2 of X, F 1 X F 2 can be written as the union of finitely many irreducible closed subsets of X. It follows that every closed subset will be a finite union of irreducible closed subsets, and that the strict inclusion ordering Ă will be well-founded on closed subsets. The latter generalizes property 7, since in a quasi-ordered set, the (Alexandroff) closed sets are exactly the downward closed sets.
This leads us to the following proof plan:
(A) Find concrete representations of all irreducible closed subsets. This programme was initiated in [20] and carried out in [22] , where we call the latter S-representations. In both the word and tree cases, our S-representations are certain forms of regular expressions, over words, or over trees. On words, this generalizes the products and the semi-linear regular expressions (SRE) of [2] ; on trees, no prior work seems to have existed. These are effective representations: we can decide inclusion (in polynomial time, modulo an oracle deciding inclusion of irreducible closed subsets of letters, resp., of function symbols), and we can compute finite intersections of S-representations (in polynomial time again, provided the number of input representations is bounded).
(B) Show directly that strict inclusion is well-founded on S-representations. This will establish property pÓq. Properties pT q and pW q are mostly obvious, since we even have algorithms to compute finite intersections.
In the case of the topological Higman Lemma (on words), we shall obtain a re-reading of Murthy and Russell's celebrated constructive proof of Higman's Lemma ( [37] ; see also [40] , footnotes 6 and 7, for fixes to the definition of sequential regular expression). Our S-representations will be their sequential regular expressions, seen as the result of building SREs (originating in [2] ) over a cotopology. Our constructive proof of Kruskal's Theorem, and indeed of its topological generalization, is in the same spirit, and we believe it provides a satisfactory answer to Murthy and Russell's final question [37] .
Intuitionism. One difficulty with finding intuitionistic proofs in the theory of wqos is that properties 1-7 are not constructively equivalent. . Following Murthy and Russell, a constructive wqo is defined by the following reformulation of property 1: (1') the opposite of the prefix ordering on bad finite sequences of words in X˚is well-founded. A finite sequence x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n is bad iff it is not good, that is, if x i ę x j for no i ă j. The well-foundedness requirement means that one cannot extend finite sequences (adding x n`1 , x n`2 , etc.) indefinitely, keeping them all bad.
Murthy and Russell actually proved property 7. They derived (1') from 7, assuming ď decidable in the constructive sense that @x, y P X¨x ď y _ px ď yq is provable. All the other constructive proofs I know of Higman's Lemma prove (1'), some of them directly [41, 7, 5] ; the latter two do not require ď to be decidable. There are fewer intuitionistic proof of Kruskal's Theorem. One is due to Monika Seisenberger [43] , who gives a direct proof of (1') on trees, based on a intuitionistic variant of Nash-Williams' minimal bad sequence argument [38] . She requires the quasi-ordering ď on function symbols to be decidable. Wim Veldman's proof [45] does not make this requirement, but models tree embedding with so-called at-most-ternary relations rather than using a binary relation ď. He shows that Kruskal's original proof [33] can be made constructive, replaying the needed part of Ramsey theory in intuitionistic logic. Curiously, our proofs of the topological versions of Higman's Lemma and Kruskal's Theorem are entirely constructive, and we only need to assume ď decidable to deduce the ordinary, order-theoretic versions of these results from the topological versions.
Path Orderings
Path orderings (mpo, lpo, rpo) have been an essential ingredient of termination proofs for rewrite systems since their inception by Nachum Dershowitz in 1982 [12] . We shall concentrate on Dershowitz' original multiset path ordering (a.k.a., mpo). He proved that the mpo was well-founded as a consequence of Kruskal's Theorem. We give an elementary, inductive, intuitionistic proof instead. This is based on a paper I wrote in 2001 [26] . Coupet-Grimal and Delobel [8] implemented a similar proof in Coq, with a proof of the Dershowitz-Manna Theorem (which I had not given, but Nipkow had [39]-see below). Dershowitz and Hoot's earlier proof that the general path ordering is well-founded [15] is nonconstructive but elementary as well. Even earlier, Lescanne had already given an inductive proof that the mpo was well-founded [35, Theorem 5] ; his proof relies on Zorn's Lemma (op.cit., Lemma 5) , and ours will be simpler anyway, but his notion of decomposition ordering is illuminating.
Let X be a set with a binary relation ă on it. We again write ą for the converse of ă. One thinks of ă as a strict ordering, but this is not needed. What will be important is that ă is well-founded : classically, this means that there is no infinite ą-chain x 1 ą x 2 ą . . . ą x n ą . . . Constructively, it is better to say that ă is well-founded iff every element is ă-accessible, where ă-accessibility is the predicate defined inductively by (i.e., the least predicate such that):
The set of ă-accessible elements is traditionally called the well-founded part of ă, i.e., the set of elements that cannot start an infinite ą-chain. Since ă-accessibility is defined inductively, we obtain the following useful principle of ă-induction: to prove that a property P holds of every ă-accessible element x, it is enough to show it under the additional assumption that P holds of every y ă x (the induction hypothesis). Another useful principle is ă-inversion: if x is ă-accessible, and x ą y, then y is ă-accessible as well.
Write t|x 1 , . . . , x n |u for the (finite) multiset consisting of the elements x 1 , . . . , x n P X. Let H H H be the empty multiset, and Z denote multiset union. We use the letters M , M 1 , . . . , for multisets. Intuitionistically, we assume an inductive definition of multisets, e.g., as finite lists, and we will reason up to permutation. (This actually incurs some practical difficulties in proof assistants such as Coq, which we shall merrily gloss over.) On the set MpXq of multisets of elements of X, we define the multiset extension ă mul of ă, inductively, by:
That is, we replace some element x by arbitrarily many smaller elements x 1 , . . . , x n . The following Dershowitz-Manna Theorem [17] is crucial.
Lemma 1 (Dershowitz-Manna, Nipkow). For all ă-accessible elements x 1 , . . . , x n P X, t|x 1 , . . . , x n |u is ă mul -accessible. In particular, if ă is well-founded on X, then ă mul is well-founded on MpXq.
Proof. We give Nipkow's intuitionistic proof [39] . Let Acc denote the set of ă mulaccessible multisets. We prove that t|x 1 , . . . , x n |u P Acc by induction on n. The case n " 0 is obvious, while the induction step consists in showing that, for every ă-accessible x: p˚q for every M P Acc, M Z t|x|u P Acc. Fix an ă-accessible x, and use ă-induction. This provides us with the induction hypothesis:
[ \ It follows that, under the same assumptions, the transitive closure ăm ul of ă mul is well-founded: for any relation R, R-accessibility and R`-accessibility coincide. Let now Σ be a signature, i.e., just a set whose elements will be understood as function symbols, with arbitrary, finite arity. The terms s, t, u, v, . . . , are inductively defined as tuples f pt 1 , . . . , t n q of an element f of Σ and of finitely many terms t 1 , . . . , t n . The base case is obtained when n " 0. There are no variables here, so our terms are the ground terms considered in the literature [16] . This is no loss of generality, as one can encode general terms as ground terms over a signature that includes all variables, understanding the variable term x as the application xpq to no argument. However, please do not confuse the latter (free) variables with the (µ-bound) variables that we introduce later.
Let « be the relation defined inductively by: f ps 1 , . . . , s m q « gpt 1 , . . . , t n q if and only if f " g, m " n, and there is a permutation π of t1, . . . , nu such that s πpiq « t i for each i, 1 ď i ď n. This is an equivalence relation, and relates terms that are equal up to permutations of arguments, anywhere in the term.
Call precedence any binary relation ă on Σ. The multiset path ordering, or mpo, ă mpo is defined inductively (together with an auxiliary relation !) by: In other words, ! is the lexicographic product of ă and of pă mpo qm ul . The relation ! is a lifting (a notion called as such in [19] , and which one can trace back to [31] ), meaning that it is well-founded on the set Acc of terms of the form f ps 1 , . . . , s m q with f ă-accessible and s 1 , . . . , s m ă mpo -accessible. Beware that this does not mean that any "-chain starting from a term f ps 1 , . . . , s m q with f ă-accessible and s 1 , . . . , s m ă mpo -accessible is finite. It only means that any infinite such chain must eventually exit Acc, i.e., reach a term gpt 1 , . . . , t n q where g is not ă-accessible, or where some t j is not ă mpo -accessible. Intuitionistically, we define the restriction ! |Acc of ! to Acc by t ! |Acc s iff t P Acc and s P Acc and t ! s; and we note that every term in Acc is ! |Acc -accessible.
Replacing " by other liftings would yield similar orderings: if we compare arguments lexicographically, for example, we would get the lexicographic path ordering (lpo), and mixing the two kinds yields the recursive path ordering (rpo) [13] . The following theorem is intuitionistic. Proposition 1. Every term whose function symbols are all ă-accessible is ă mpoaccessible. In particular, if ă is well-founded, then ă mpo is well-founded on terms.
Proof. In the course of the proof, we shall need to observe that: p˚q for every ă mpo -accessible term u, for every term t such that u « t, t is ă mpo -accessible. This requires us to show first that if u « t and t ą mpo s, then u ą mpo s, an easy induction on the definition of ă mpo . We show p˚q by ă mpo -induction on u, i.e., that for every t such that u « t, for every s ă mpo t, s is ă mpo -accessible; the assumptions imply s ă mpo u, and the claim follows by induction hypothesis. Let Acc be the set of ă mpo -accessible terms, and W be the set of terms whose function symbols are all ă-accessible. As above, we define Acc as the set of terms of the form f pt 1 , . . . , t n q such that f is ă-accessible and whose arguments t 1 , . . . , t n are in Acc. We show that every t P W is in Acc, by structural induction on t. This means showing that for every s P Acc, s is in Acc.
We first give a classical argument, in the hope that it will be clearer. We shall need to use the immediate subterm relation Ÿ, defined inductively by gpt 1 , . . . , t m q Ź t j for all g, t 1 , . . . , t m and j. This is a well-founded relation. Assume there is term s P Acc that is not in Acc. In other words, the set Acc Acc is non-empty. Since ! is a lifting, it is well-founded on Acc, hence on Acc Acc: so there is a !-minimal element s in Acc Acc. Since s R Acc, it starts an infinite ą mpo -chain, so s ą mpo t for some t R Acc. Among these terms t we pick one that is Ÿ-minimal: writing t as gpt 1 , . . . , t n q, this assures us that for every j such that s ą mpo t j , t j P Acc. The fact s ą mpo t is obtained by rule pSubq or by rule pGtq. pSubq is out of the question, though, since that would mean s " f ps 1 , . . . , s m q with some s i ą " mpo t; but s P Acc implies s i P Acc, hence t P Acc, either because s i « t, using p˚q, or because s i ą mpo t, using ă mpo -inversion: contradiction. So rule pGtq must have been used: s " t " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q with s ą mpo t j for every j. Since s was chosen "-minimal, t cannot be in Acc Acc, and since t R Acc, t is not in Acc: so t j R Acc for some j. However, s ą mpo t j together with the fact that t was Ÿ-minimal implies t j P Acc, a contradiction.
We obtain an intuitionistic proof by replacing minimal counter-examples by induction principles. We wish to show that for every term s P Acc then s P Acc. Since ! is a lifting, s P Acc is ! |Acc -accessible, so ! |Acc -induction applies and we obtain the following induction hypothesis: paq for every t ! s, if t P Acc then t P Acc. Our goal is to prove that s P Acc, i.e., that every t ă mpo s is in Acc. We show this by Ÿ-induction on t " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q, which means that we have the extra induction hypothesis: pbq for every j, if t j ă mpo s then t j P Acc. If t ă mpo s was obtained by pSubq, then s " f ps 1 , . . . , s m q with s i ą " mpo t for some i; since s P Acc, s i P Acc hence t P Acc, either by p˚q if s i « t, or by ă mpo -inversion if s i ą mpo t. If t ă mpo s was obtained by pGtq, then s " t and s ą mpo t j for every j. By pbq, t j P Acc for every j. Also, s " t implies f ą " g, and since s P Acc, f is ă-accessible, hence also g: so t " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q is in Acc. By paq, t P Acc.
[ \ I'm not claiming that the above proof is novel. This is the core of Theorem 1 of [26] , later improved by Dawson and Goré [9] . Dershowitz [14] gives a broader perspective on this kind of results. That its proof is constructive is also one argument set forth in [26] , and, as I've said already, this was made precise and implemented in Coq by Coupet-Grimal and Delobel [8] .
I had also argued that the proof technique of [26] extended to prove abstract termination arguments, some of whose applied to graphs, for example. I'll develop this now for a new relation on a class of so-called µ-terms, defined by the following (pseudo-)grammar:
The iterator µx " spxq¨t should be thought of as some kind of infinite term . . . sp. . . spsptqq . . .q. The variable x is bound in µx " s¨t, its scope is s. A term t is ground if and only if fvptq " H, where the set fvptq of free variables of t is defined inductively by fvpxq " txu, fvpf ps 1 , . . . , s m" Ť m i"1 fvps i q, fvpµx " s¨s 1 q " pfvpsq txuq Y fvps 1 q. For instance, µx " f pxq¨gpaq is a ground µ-term. Again, we give ourselves a precedence ă on Σ. We extend the definition of « by letting µx " s¨s 1 « µx " t¨t 1 if and only if s « t and s 1 « t 1 , and x « x for every variable x. (We make an abuse of notation here and silently assume a form of α-renaming. A more correct definition would be: µx " s¨s 1 « µy " t¨t 1 iff srx :" zs « try :" zs and s 1 « t 1 , for z a fresh variable. We shall make similar abuses of notation in rules pµGtµq, pµ!q and pµ!µq below, to avoid clutter.) We take the same rules defining ă mpo and ! as above, and add the following to also compare variables and iterations, either together or with other terms:
The unusual rule pV arq states that every ground µ-term is strictly smaller than any variable. This allows us to check, for example, that µx " f pxq¨gpaq ą mpo f pf pf pf pgpa, where a is a constant: using pµGtq and pµ!q, this requires us to check two premises, of which one is f pxq ą mpo f pf pf pf pgpa; the latter follows, using pGtq, from x ą mpo f pf pf pgpa, and this, in turn, is an instance of pV arq. We leave the rest of the verification to the reader.
The above rules are probably not the ones one would have imagined. In particular, it would seem natural to consider µx " spxq¨s 1 and spµx " s¨s 1 q as equivalent. This would suggest the following alternative to pµGtq: to prove µx " spxq¨s 1 ą mpo t (where t " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q, and for simplicity we assume both sides of the inequality to be ground), prove spµx " spxq¨s 1 q ą mpo t and @j¨µx " s¨s 1 ą mpo t j . Instead of proving spµx " spxq¨s 1 q ą mpo t, pµGtq (together with pµ!q) only requires us to prove spxq ą mpo t, a seemingly much weaker statement, since x is not just greater than or equal to µx " spxq¨s 1 , but strictly greater than any ground term by pV arq. Although they are not what we would imagined at first, these are the rules that arise from our study of the topological Kruskal Theorem (Section 5).
The following is new, and probably useful in other contexts. Our proof is intuitionistic. The proof is similar to Proposition 1, or to Theorem 1 of [26] , but we need a few easy additional arguments near the end of the proof. Theorem 1. Every µ-term whose function symbols are all ă-accessible is ă mpoaccessible. In particular, if ă is well-founded, then ă mpo is well-founded on µ-terms.
Proof. One might think that Theorem 1 is an easy consequence of Proposition 1: encode µx " s¨s 1 as the ordinary term µps, s 1 q, and the variable x as xpq, and extend the precedence appropriately. This strategy does not work, as for example pV arq requires x ą mpo µx " f pxq¨gpaq. In the encoding, this would force x ą mpo µpf pxq, gpaqq, which is plainly false, since µpf pxq, gpaqq ą mpo x. We imitate the proof of Proposition 1. Again, we have: p˚q for every ă mpoaccessible µ-term u, for every µ-term t such that u « t, t is ă mpo -accessible. Define the immediate subterms of a µ-term in the expected way, as follows: the immediate subterms of gpt 1 , . . . , t m q are t 1 , . . . , t n , the immediate subterms of µx " s¨s 1 are s and s 1 , and variables have no immediate subterms. We need to define Ÿ slightly differently, inductively, by: piq gpt 1 , . . . , t m q Ź t j for all g P Σ, µ-terms t 1 , . . . , t m and j; piiq x Ź t for every variable x and ground µ-term t; piiiq µx " s¨s 1 Ź s 1 (not s!). We first show that Ÿ is well-founded. This is done in several steps. We first show that every ground µ-term t is Ÿ-accessible, by induction on t; crucially, if µx " s¨s 1 is ground and µx " s¨s 1 Ź s 1 , then s 1 is ground and the induction hypothesis applies. We then do a secondary induction to establish that every µ-term is Ÿ-accessible, using the previous claim in the case of variables.
Let Acc be the set of ă mpo -accessible µ-terms, and W be the set of µ-terms whose function symbols are all ă-accessible. Say that a µ-term is head accessible if and only if it is a variable, an iterator µx " s¨s 1 with s head accessible, or an application f ps 1 , . . . , s m q with f ă-accessible. The point is: p:q if s " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q and s is head accessible, then g is ă-accessible. This is proved by induction on the proof of s " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q; the base case is when s is of the form f ps 1 , . . . , s m q, where necessarily f ě g, and f is ă-accessible since s is head accessible. We also define Acc as the set of head accessible µ-terms s whose immediate subterms are all in Acc.
Again, ! is a lifting, namely, every term in Acc is ! |Acc -accessible. This is proved in two steps. We first show that every variable x is ! |Acc -accessible (vacuous: x " t for no µ-term t), and that every application f ps 1 , . . . , s m q in Acc is ! |Acc -accessible: this is by double induction (ă-induction on f , then pă mpo qm ulinduction on t|s 1 , . . . , s m |u), using the fact that f ps 1 , . . . , s m q " t implies that t " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q with f ą g or [f " g and t|s 1 , . . . , s m |u pą mpo qm ul t|t 1 , . . . , t n |u]. We then show that every iterator µx " s¨s 1 in Acc is ! |Acc -accessible, by ă mpoinduction on s. To do so, we consider the µ-terms t P Acc such that t ! µx " s¨s 1 . Those obtained by rule pµ!q are ! |Acc -accessible by the first step, and those obtained by rule pµ!µq are ! |Acc -accessible by the induction hypothesis.
Let us pause a minute, and observe the following, called 'Property 1' in [26] . For all µ-terms s, t, if s ą mpo t then either:
mpo t for some µ-term u, or: piiq s " t and s ą mpo u for every u Ÿ t.
Case piq happens in case s ą mpo t was derived using pSubq, pµSubq, or pV arq. Case piiq happens in case it was derived using pGtq, pµGtq, or pµGtµq.
We now show that every t P W is in Acc, by structural induction on t. This means showing that for every s P Acc, s is in Acc. Since ! is a lifting, s P Acc is ! |Acc -accessible, so ! |Acc -induction applies and we obtain the following induction hypothesis: paq for every t ! s, if t P Acc then t P Acc. Our goal is to prove that s P Acc, i.e., that every t ă mpo s is in Acc. We show this by Ÿ-induction on t, which means that we have the extra induction hypothesis: pbq for every u Ÿ t, if u ă mpo s then u P Acc. Since t ă mpo s, either piq or piiq is true. If piq holds, then s Ź u ą " mpo t, so u P Acc since s P Acc and u Ÿ s; therefore t P Acc, by p˚q if u « t, by ă mpo -inversion if u ą mpo t. So assume piiq. We claim that t is in Acc. This is trivial if t is a variable. If t is an application gpt 1 , . . . , t n q then for each j, t j Ÿ s, so by taking u " t j in pbq, we obtain that t j is in Acc; g is ă-accessible since s " gpt 1 , . . . , t n q, using p:q; so t P Acc. If t is an iterator µx " t 1¨t2 , then pbq only implies that t 2 is in Acc. To obtain t 1 P Acc, we realize that we can only have derived s " t by rule pµ!µq, which implies that s is of the form µx " s 1¨s2 with s 1 ą mpo t 1 : since s P Acc, s 1 is in Acc hence t 1 is in Acc by ă mpo -inversion. In any case, t is in Acc. Since also t ! s, paq applies, so that t is in Acc, as desired.
[ \
A constructive proof of Higman's Lemma
It is time to apply all this and prove the topological Higman Lemma. Given a set X with a quasi-ordering ď, the embedding quasi-ordering ď˚on X˚is the smallest relation such that x 1 ď y 1 , . . . , x n ď y n imply x 1 . . . x n ď w 0 y 1 w 1 . . . w n´1 y n w n , where w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w n´1 , w n are arbitrary words in X˚. In other words, to go down in ď˚, remove some letters and replace the others by smaller ones. Higman's Lemma states that if ď is wqo, then so is ď˚. The topological Higman Lemma states that if X is a Noetherian topological space, then X˚with the word topology is Noetherian, too. We have already discussed this in Section 2.
Step (A) of our proof plan consists in discovering an S-representation of X˚, for X Noetherian. (Step (A) is not constructive.) In [22] , we defined an Srepresentation of a Noetherian space X as a tuple pS, S _ , ¢, τ,^q, where S is a set of elements, meant to denote the irreducible closed subsets of X, through the denotation map _ , ¢ denotes inclusion, τ represents the whole space, andî mplements intersection. We change this slightly, and replace ¢ by its strict part Ă 2 . Hence, call S-representation of a Noetherian space X any tuple pS, Ă, τ,^q, where S is a set, _ : S Ñ SpXq is a bijective denotation function, Ă is a binary relation on S denoting strict inclusion (i.e., a Ă b iff a Ă b ), τ is a finite subset of S denoting the whole of X ( τ " X, where we extend the notation a for a P S to A for A P PpSq, by letting A " Ť aPA a ), and for all a, b P S, a^b is a finite subset of S denoting their intersection ( a^b " a X b ). When X is Noetherian, Ă will be well-founded (property pÓq), τ will exist by property pT q, and^will make sense because of property pW q.
Since a 1 is irreducible for every a 1 P A 1 , the inclusion A Ď A 1 is equivalent to A Ď 5 A 1 , where we write Ď for the union of Ă and ", and the Hoare quasi-ordering Ď 5 is defined by: for every a P A, there is an a 1 P A 1 such that a Ď a 1 . Since A, A 1 are antichains, one can encode them as multisets. A moment's notice shows that the strict part of Ď 5 is just Ă mul`. This will be used to compare antichains A, A 1 below.
Fig. 1. Deciding strict inclusion between word-products
Given an S-representation pS, S _ , Ă, τ,^q of X, Theorem 6.14 of [22] gives us an S-representation pS w , S _ w , Ă w , τ w ,^wq of X˚. S w is a set of so-called 2 In all rigor, we should also include the associated congruence ", defined by a " b iff a ¢ b and b ¢ a. We silently assume we are working in the quotient of the Srepresentation by ". In proof assistants such as Coq, this is not an option, and the standard solution is to use setoid types. In any case, considering " explicitly would make our exposition too complex, and we shall therefore avoid it. We also change the notation from ¢ to Ă to avoid a conflict with the relations Ź of Section 3 word-products, first invented in the setting of forward coverability procedures for lossy channel systems [2] . Define the atomic expressions as a ? with a P S (denoting the set of words with at most one letter in a ), and A˚with A a nonempty finite antichain of S (denoting the set of words, of arbitrary length, whose letters are all in A ). The word-products P , P 1 , . . . , are the finite sequences e 1 e 2 . . . e n of atomic expressions, denoting the concatenations of words in the denotations of e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n , and we define S w as those that are reduced, namely those where e i e i`1 w is included neither in e i w nor in e i`1 w for every i. Inclusion between word-products is decidable, using simple formulae given for example in [22, Lemma 6.8, Lemma 6.9] , and this allows us to give computable predicates that sieve out the non-reduced word-products. We are more interested in the relation Ă w . Two reduced word-products, that is, two elements of S w , have equal denotations iff they are equal. One can show that the strict inclusion relation Ă w on reduced word-products is defined inductively by the rules of Figure 1 . We write P Ď w P 1 for P Ă w P 1 or P " P We now embark on step (B) of our proof plan. Contrarily to step (A), we must pay attention to only invoke constructive arguments. So forget everything we have done in step (A), except for the final result. Say that pS, Ă, τ,^q is a constructive S-representation (without reference to X) if and only if S is a set with a strict ordering Ă, and where: pÓq Ă is well-founded; pT q S " Ó τ ; pW q for all a, b P S, Ó a X Ó b " Ópa^bq; Ď stands for the union of Ă and ", Ó A for the downward closure of a subset A of S with respect to Ď, and Ó a for Ótau.
We now posit pS w , Ă w , τ w ,^wq by the syntax given above, in step (A). S w is the set of reduced word-products over S, Ă w is defined inductively by pw1q-pw5q, τ w " tτ˚u, and we define^w by the recursive formula of [22, Lemma 6.11] .
Theorem 2. If pS, Ă, τ,^q is a constructive S-representation, then so is pS w , Ă w , τ w ,^wq.
Proof. (Sketch.) There is a boring part, consisting in checking that Ă w is a strict ordering, and that properties pT q and pW q hold. We omit it here. The interesting part is checking that Ă w is well-founded. Define a mapping µ from atomic expressions to pairs pi, Aq P t0, 1uˆMpSq by µpa ? q " p0, t|a|uq, µpA˚q " p1, Aq, and order them by the lexicographical product ă of the ordering 0 ă 1 and of Ăm ul . Extend µ to word-products by µpe 1 . . . e n q " t|µpe 1 q, . . . , µpe n q|u. In other words, we look at word-products as though they were multisets of atomic expressions, where the latter as read as multisets of letters from S, plus a tag, 0 or 1. It is fairly easy to show that for all reduced word-products P , P 1 , if P Ă P 1 then µpP q ăm ul µpP 1 q, by induction on the structure of a proof of P Ă P 1 . By Lemma 1, ăm ul is well-founded. By ăm ul -induction on µpP q, P is then Ă-accessible, for every P P S w .
